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ABSTRACT 
Realism has been a central object of attention among analytical philosophers for some decades. 
Starting from analytical philosophy, the return of realism has spread into other contemporary 
philosophical traditions and given birth to new trends in current discussions, as for example in 
the debates about “new realism.” Discussions about realism focused on linguistic meaning, 
epistemology, metaphysics, theory of action and ethics. The implications for politics of 
discussion about realism in action theory and in ethics, however, are not much discussed. This 
collection includes essay which address from different and complementary points of view the 
issue of the social and political relevance of philosophical debates on realism. 
 
KEYWORDS 
Realism, politics, action theory, ethics 
 
 
 
Realism has been a central object of attention among analytical philosophers for 
some decades. Initially focused on problems related to semantics, discussions 
about realism turned to problems in epistemology, in metaphysics, in theory of 
action and in ethics. In current debates we can observe a new return to realism, 
which seeks to overcome the anti-realist implications of representational theories 
of the mind typical of modern philosophy. The realist trend has become one of the 
most original contribution of analytical philosophy to contemporary thinking, a 
contribution which often also purports to offer a philosophical rehabilitation of 
more ancient ways of thinking (De Anna, 2001). Starting from analytical 
philosophy, the return of realism has spread into other contemporary 
philosophical traditions and given birth to new trends in current discussions, as 
for example in the debates about “new realism” (De Caro and Ferraris, 2012; 
Ferraris, 2012; Possenti and Lavazza, 2013). 
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The implications of recent debates for political philosophy and political 
practice have not yet been widely discussed. Generally, political theorists still rely 
on a framework of practical rationality which pre-dates recent discussions about 
realism and which postulates that the good is wholly subjective, i.e. relative to 
either individuals or societies (Rawls, 1971 and 1993; Habermas, 1981). The hope 
is that, by assuming a subjectivist view of rationality, clashes between the diverse 
positions upheld in complex contemporary societies may be prevented. 
Discussions about policy-making and public decisions in multicultural societies 
normally start from the assumption of this notion of rationality (Kymlicka 1996 
and 2007). This perspective, however, has proved to be deficient from the point of 
view of fostering convergence of identities into unitary and harmonic societies. It 
leads to fragmented societies, instead of constructing communities where people 
may gradually converge on a shared view of what is worth achieving together. 
The subjectivist view of practical rationality originated in early modern 
philosophy and was significant in European history – since it helped to recognize 
the legitimacy of different cultures within a wider anthropological, rather than 
metaphysical, intellectual outlook. Yet this ended by fostering idealistic (i.e. 
strongly anti-realistic) worldviews (Martinelli, 2004 and 2010). Nevertheless, it 
can be argued that cultural relativism does not necessarily imply idealism and 
that realism does not necessarily deny the legitimacy of cultural diversity. 
The essays collected in this volume aim at discussing the framework of 
practical rationality for policy making which is usually assumed by current 
political theories, by considering the relevance for practical rationality in the 
political contexts of current debates on moral and epistemic realism, and on the 
ethical relevance of recent achievements of biological sciences. 
Debates about realism ensue from the work of contemporary philosophers 
such as Hilary Putnam (1999), John McDowell (1998, 2004), Thomas Nagel 
(1986), etc. Unlike older, naïve versions of realism, the realism supported by 
recent analytical philosophers rejects the possibility of an absolute perspective on 
reality, while maintaining the notion that our cognitive efforts are at least partly 
constrained by objective reality. The moral upshot is that the good is not merely a 
subjective or social construction, but it is the result of typically human responses 
to the demands of a reality that is structured in a certain way, and, due to its 
structure, has built-in possibilities of perfection. There is no absolute conception 
of the good, but still features of reality can be criteria for practical rationality and 
for the aptness of human subjective responses to problematic decisional situations 
(Putnam 2002 and 2004, Nagel 1979, McDowell 1998). 
Discussions about the ethical relevance of recent findings in the biological 
sciences have contended – among other things –that the results of empirical 
investigations suggest that there are many homologies between human and 
animal behaviour, to the extent that it can hardly be denied that morality is 
deeply grounded in our animal nature, contra many subjectivist claims. This 
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suggests that some moral notions are deeply rooted in our biological nature 
(Boniolo and De Anna, 2006; De Waal, 1998; Illies, 2006; Hösle and Illies, 2005). 
On the other hand, transcendental considerations suggest that human reasoning 
can justify the normativity of ethically guided action in humans. Again, this 
suggests a notion of ethics which is objective and anti-absolutistic at the same 
time (Illies, 2003 and 2006; Nagel, 1986 and 2012). 
The political upshots of these converging conclusions in epistemology and in 
ethics are still object of discussion. Most importantly, the recognition that human 
practical rationality is ruled by what agents conceive as objectively good has 
important implications for the notions of political authority and consent. On the 
one hand, against subjectivist views of the good, the new framework purports that 
arguments about what is good can have a justificatory and legitimating role in the 
practices of political decision-making and in the formation of consent. On the 
other hand, against old-style realist views, the new framework denies that there is 
an absolute conception of the good, and is thereby sensitive to the subjective 
positions of those who have to consent to political authority: this sets limits to 
political authority. Breaking those limits would constitute a violation of the 
humanity of those subject to authority, and would progressively undermine their 
consent, and hence destroy the very strength of authority, and, hence, of the 
community (De Anna, 2012a and 2012b; Besussi, 2012 and 2013). 
How do recent conclusions about epistemic and moral realism change our 
ways of conceiving practical reason? And how does the ensuing conception of 
practical reason change our ways of conceptualising politics, and affect our ways 
of practicing it? What are the normative implications of this reconceptualisation? 
These essays intend to address these questions and subsequent issues. 
The first four papers of the collection focus on moral realism and jointly offer 
an account of realism which touch upon foundational issues (e.g, problems 
concerning the metaphysics of moral reality) and epistemological issues (e.g., 
problems concerning the character of practical rationality and the origins of 
normativity). 
Riccardo Martinelli’s essay, “Realism, Ontology, and the Concept of Reality,” 
focuses on metaphysical realism and the problem of defining reality from within 
an historical perspective. Quite often, realists adopt a merely negative definition 
of reality, which is considered “independent of” our mental thoughts, conceptual 
schemes, or linguistic practices, etc. This approach possibly overcomes old-style 
idealism, yet raises several problems. As an alternative framework, Martinelli 
discusses the traditional definition of reality as “capacity to act,” or effectiveness, 
an argumentative strategy that enables us to solve some of the difficulties with 
ontological realism.  
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Salvatore Lavecchia, in “Agathological Realism. Searching for the Good 
beyond Subjectivity and Objectivity or On the Importance of Being Platonic”, 
combines two aspects of Plato’s writings: the claims on the Demiurge made in the 
Timaeus and the analogy of the sun presented in the Republic. By explaining the 
analogy of the sun through the image of an intelligible sphere of light, Lavecchia 
suggests an interpretation of Plato according to which the idea of the Good is 
radically self-giving and self-transcendent, in a way that overcomes all 
dichotomies between subjectivity and objectivity, knowledge and morality, ethics 
and ontology. Building on Plato’s argument, he supports a form of moral realism 
which meets objections to which modern and contemporary varieties of moral 
realism are open. 
Alexander Fischer and Marko Fuchs are co-authors of the essay entitled 
“‘Solidarity at the Time of the Fall’: Adorno and Rorty on Moral Realism.” They 
deploy arguments by Theodor W. Adorno to suggest that Richard Rorty’s 
criticism of moral realism is not quite radical enough. In their view, Rorty’s very 
alternative to moral realism – according to which ethnic groups represent the 
ultimate measure of moral judgment without any possibility of critique – would 
be excessively naïve. Adorno’s proposal, instead, rejects moral realism in the 
traditional sense, while still allowing a radical criticism of communities and 
cultures. Such a criticism is entirely possible, via his negative dialectics which 
reject metaphysics on the ground that it would reduce to identity the non-identity 
of individuals. Fischer and Fuchs do not spend time looking at some of the 
contentious facets of Adorno’s negative dialectics, which are very relevant for 
current discussions on realism: e.g., the issue whether sense can be made of a 
radical non-identity, given the ways in which we deploy our concepts, which 
always seem to imply a certain degree of identification of different individuals. 
The problem, then, is whether metaphysics can be avoided at all. Fischer and 
Fuchs, however, do stress an important implication of Adorno’s arguments for 
moral realism: he is committed to a form of moral realism to the extent that he 
encourages us to take into account that moral thinking is oriented to action and 
hence must be about particulars. The reality of single individuals, hence, cannot 
be overlooked by any realist account of morality. In this way, the authors 
contribute to a full understanding of moral realism, by challenging any account 
that concentrates solely on the existence of universal values or moral laws. 
Mario De Caro and Massimo Marraffa, in their essay “Bacon against 
Descartes. Emotions, Rationality, Defenses,” review recent scientific literature 
suggesting that emotions are not a natural kind and that human reasoning is not a 
unitary, normatively regulated faculty. On that basis they claim that the old 
pyramidal conception of the mind, according to which reason rules the passions 
and other lower cognitive faculties, is no longer viable. By contrast they suggest 
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that emotions and diverse rational capacities cooperate in constructing an image 
of reality which answers our pragmatic interests. The upshot of this, they claim, is 
that empirical reality, normative reality and social and political institutions are 
on the same level. Discussion concerning the relevance of moral realism for politics 
involves a consideration of how practical rationality functions in public contexts. 
This opens the problem of explaining how pragmatic considerations are relevant 
to an account of practical reason. The issue emerged particularly in this essay by 
De Caro and Marraffa. Hence, at this point, the following question presents itself: 
How does moral realism affect the pragmatic aspects of practical rationality? A 
second group of three essays addresses this question. 
Paolo Labinaz’ essay, “Reasoning, Argumentation and Rationality”, 
discusses recent “argumentative approaches” to the study of theoretical and 
practical reasoning. Philosophical reasons and empirical evidence suggest that 
reasoning is argumentative in nature, and recent argumentative approaches to 
reasoning rightly take this into account. However, in Labinaz’ view, such 
approaches fail to draw all the implications from that evidence. After reviewing 
the main argumentative approaches to reasoning, the author argues that they 
have a partial view of the connection between reasoning and argumentation, since 
they focus exclusively on the capacity of reasoning to produce convincing 
arguments. In this way they mainly stress the persuasive and therefore 
instrumental function of reasoning. By contrast, Labinaz supports an alternative 
argumentative conception of rationality, outlined by Paul Grice and recently 
developed by Marina Sbisà, which underlines the reason-giving function of 
reasoning. Labinaz’ conclusion suggests that reasoning – including practical 
reasoning – is intrinsically tied to the relations a cognizer or an agent has with 
other cognizers or agents, and this suggests that practical reason is inherently 
connected to the communitarian, political or otherwise, dimension of human 
existence. 
The connections between the pragmatic conditions of social and political 
argumentation with moral realism are touched upon by Thomas Becker, in his 
chapter titled “Is Truth Relevant? On the Relevance of Relevance.” Becker 
argues that factual and evaluative statements are on a par with each other insofar 
as their relation to truth is concerned: in both cases, truth is to be construed as 
depending on "practical relevance." The author suggests that the demand that an 
assertion must be practically relevant for the addressee is a precondition of the 
truth of the assertion and of the demand that the assertion must be based on 
knowledge held by the asserter. On the basis of this premise, Becker offers an 
account of the truth of normative statements, based on a realistic image of the 
world. 
Marina Sbisà, in her essay entitled “The Austinian Conception of Illocution 
and its Implications for Value and Social Ontology,” discusses the importance of 
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illocutionary uptake in Austin’s theory of speech acts, and its theoretical 
implications, in particular for the distinction between facts and values, for moral 
realism, and for social ontology. In her view, illocutionary uptake is the basic 
source of deontic states and objects. One could expect that this might lead to a 
form of relativism, but Sbisà stresses that the distinction between the correctness 
and the incorrectness of verdictives is not merely a matter of intersubjective 
agreement. Consequently, the assessment of speech is not carried out on one level 
only, but on two: indeed, in Austin’s terms, we can distinguish the 
felicity/infelicity assessment from the (objective) correctness/incorrectness 
assessment. Defeasibility concerns cases of infelicity, while error and injustice 
concern incorrectness, thereby opening the possibility of moral realism. However, 
since judgments about correctness still depend on our repeated efforts to adjust 
and improve our relations to the world we live in, – Sbisà contends – the ensuing 
moral realism eludes the temptation of assuming that there might an absolute 
point of view. 
The relevance of moral realism for practical rationality and the pragmatic 
consequences on the social and political level are the topic of the above essays. 
The next group of two essays turns to political philosophy and political practice, 
and discusses how the anthropological contentions so far outlined are relevant for 
our philosophical understanding of politics. 
The essay by Christian Illies, “The Relevance of Anthropology and the 
Evolutionary Sciences for Political Philosophy,” address the clash between two 
opposite approaches to human nature which, in the past decades, have led to 
contrasting understandings of politics: that according to which our social 
dimension is totally culturally construed, and that according to which our social 
dimension is an output of our biological nature. Illies shows that the contrast is 
somehow artificial, and asks, on the one hand, how we can understand the relation 
between cultural development and the biological nature of humans, and, on the 
other hand, how consideration of the interplay between culture and biology may 
be helpful for political thinking, e.g., in understanding and improving institutions 
and political decisions. This opens the way to a form of moderate political realism, 
in that data coming from the natural sciences is given weight in normative 
discourse, although in a non-reductive form. 
Gabriele De Anna, in “Realism, Human Action and Political Life. On the 
Political Dimension of Individual Choices”, draws on an account of human action 
according to which we are led by reasons, and on an understanding of reasons 
which are to be understood on a 'partial realism' model, to discuss current ways of 
seeing political communities and the role of institutions. At the foundations of his 
understanding of human action and reasons for action, he contends that reference 
to the good in political contexts is unavoidable. He further claims that reference 
to the good must be welcome, since an open discussion of different conceptions of 
Guest Editors’ Preface 
 
523 
 
the good present in society is the best way to achieve agreement and to attain a 
peaceful coexistence. 
The last group includes two essays which focus on the relevance of realism in 
the domain of politics for related fields of knowledge: jurisprudence and 
economics. 
The essay by Elvio Ancona, “Determining ius According to Thomas Aquinas. 
A realistic Model for Juridical Decisions”, focuses on the nature of law, and on its 
relations to reality and human rationality, by considering the contribution of 
Thomas Aquinas, who – on the topic of law – offered a comprehensive account 
built on the longstanding tradition of Roman law and natural law. Ancona 
highlights that, according to Aquinas, the determination of the ius (i.e., of what is 
right), which takes place in legal judgments, emerges from the comparison 
between the juridical positions of the parties and this gives it a realist 
connotation. The realist connotation has important methodological implications: 
dialectics can thereby be proposed as a particular method for legal decisions, as 
method which seeks the discovery of rules and principles that are common to 
different parties, in view of the identification of what is just in the claims of each 
of them. This method shows a practical way in which a realist understanding of 
normativity can be beneficial to societies where different conceptions of the good 
need to co-exist and cooperate. 
In “Reason, Morality and Skill,” John Stopford draws on Ancient Greek 
economic thought, including Aristotle’s views on the natural limitation of wealth, 
to discuss the problem of human flourishing in ecologically challenged societies. 
Some economists have recently argued that current societies must address 
ecological emergencies by working out ways to live in situations of diminishing 
economic growth. However, societies with very low levels of growth face issues of 
social instability due to recessions, unemployment and the decrease of social 
benefits. Stopford considers the solution to this problem proposed by economic 
capability theorists, influenced by the work of Sen and Nussbaum: prosperity 
should be redefined as capability development “within limits.” Stopford argues 
that the new definition of prosperity calls for a reexamination the role of skill in 
the development of capabilities. The marginalization of skill has become a typical 
trait of modern industrial and consumer societies. However, Stopford shows, 
certain kinds of skill, exemplified in the work of the autonomously productive 
craftsman, are necessary to a full development of the capabilities that low growth 
political communities should promote. 
The essays collected here represent the result of a common work made by all 
the authors – together with other colleagues and with students – during a 
workshop which took place at the University of Bamberg, in Germany, between 
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the 19th and the 22nd of December 2013. The workshop was part of the project 
Moral Realism and Political Decisions: A new framework of practical rationality for 
contemporary multicultural Europe (MULTIRATIOPOL), which was funded by the 
Deutscher Akademischer Austausch Dienst - DAAD, in the context of the 
Hochschuldialog mit Südeuropa scheme. The project was presented by the 
University of Bamberg (Germany) and the University or Trieste (Italy), and it 
involved also the joint Master Program in Philosophy between the Universities of 
Trieste and Udine. Students and Faculty members from the three Universities – 
together with some invited speakers – took part in the event, which included 
plenary talks, discussions in groups and round tables. The relations between moral 
realism, practical rationality and political decisions were addressed in many of 
their facets. The papers here collected are not papers presented in the workshop, 
but original pieces which were written after the workshop by some of the 
participants, on the ground of the common work carried out during the workshop. 
(One exception is represented by the paper by Christian Illies which had already 
appeared in a slightly different form somewhere else, in German, but which well 
represents the contribution given by Professor Illies at the workshop). We are 
grateful to DAAD for their financial support for this initiative. 
While we were editing this volume, one of the contributors, Professor Thomas 
Becker, Chair of German Linguistics at the University of Bamberg, unexpectedly 
and tragically passed away. He had actively participated to the workshop, and 
showed an eagerness to discuss with philosophers which was uncommon. 
Philosophers profited much from his generous contribution. In his essay included 
in this collection, he had started new, interesting paths of investigation. He was 
looking forward to further develop these thoughts in collaboration with the 
research group which was formed during the workshop, and all the other 
participants to the project were counting on his valuable contribution. His tragic 
departure left an enormous emptiness among this group of researchers, as among 
his colleagues, his friends and in his family. We dedicate this collection to his 
memory. 
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